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Abstract
When a new piece of information contradicts a currently held belief, one
has to modify the set of beliefs in order to restore its consistency.  In the case
where it is necessary to give up a belief, some of them are less likely to be
abandoned than others.  The concept of epistemic entrenchment is used by
some AI approaches to explain this fact based on formal properties of the belief
set (e. g. , transitivity). Two experiments were designed to test the hypothesis
that contrary to such views, (i) belief is naturally represented by degrees rather
than in an all-or-nothing manner, (ii) entrenchment is primarily a matter of content
and not only a matter of form, and (iii) consequently prior degree of belief is a
powerful factor of change.  The two experiments used Elio and Pelletier's (1997)
paradigm in which participants were presented with full simple deductive
arguments whose conclusion was denied, following which they were asked to
decide which premise to revise.
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Belief Revision and Uncertain Reasoning
Changing belief is a pervasive mental activity.  It occurs when the course of
events does not meet the individual's expectations, or when indisputable facts
run counter to the individual's anticipations.  It also occurs during communication
(e. g. , upon being convinced by one's interlocutor), in learning, in problem
solving when new data transform the problem space, etc.  This work addresses
belief change by asking, How does an individual react when (s)he receives new
information that contradicts some logical entailment of his/her current beliefs?
More precisely, consider an individual who entertains a consistent set of beliefs
regarding some specific topic.  By deduction, that individual may infer a
conclusion.  Suppose a new piece of factual information on the world arrives and
that it contradicts the former conclusion.  Now the individual faces a conflict:  On
the one hand, (s)he believes the conclusion obtained by a valid deduction.  But
on the other hand,  (s)he also believes the contradictory fact obtained from a
source that is presumably reliable.  The consistency of the original set of beliefs
is temporarily broken.
One solution to restore consistency, called belief revision  in Artificial
Intelligence (Gärdenfors, 1988), consists of incorporating the new information
and at the same time giving up some of the premises.  But there may not be a
unique way to do so.  When there is a choice between premises to be
abandoned, what are the rational bases for making a decision?  One of the basic
rationality principles that constrains belief change, and in particular belief
revision, is that the new set which incorporates the new information should be the
result of minimal changes from the original set (Harman, 1986).  In addition,
although this approach is non-probabilistic (that is, it considers propositional
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contents to be fully believed) it nevertheless acknowledges that propositions
which are candidates for abandonment may differ in their ease of disbelief.  It
seems clear that some beliefs are more important than others in terms of their
explanatory power or informational content, which discourages the individual
from abandoning them.  This is what the notion epistemic entrenchment
captures:  a resistance to be given up.  It is thus possible to spell out on logical
grounds a few postulates which define a hierarchy among propositions of a belief
set, hence a unique solution to the revision problem (Gärdenfors, 1992).
To what extent are such concepts and formalisms applicable to human
knowledge representation and inferential activity?  Elio & Pelletier (1997)
presented a pioneering study that investigated two kinds of issue.  One is to
know whether the entrenchment of a  belief is affected by the logical form of the
associated proposition.  For that purpose, they considered the special case of
conditionals as opposed to non conditional sentences.  Three experiments
indicated that participants were more prone to abandon a conditional premise
than a non conditional one.  This was observed with thematic conditional
statements presented in the framework of a scenario and with formal material
(but was more pronounced in the former case).  For example, participants in the
first experiment received full arguments (here a Modus Ponens with formal
material) such as: if Lex's have a P, then they also have an R  (= P --> R); Max is
a Lex that has a P  (= P);  therefore Max has an R  (= R)  followed by the
contradictory information that in fact Max does not have an R  (= ¬R).
Participants were then asked to choose among several belief sets the one they
thought "the best way to reconcile all the knowledge"; in the present case, they
had to choose among: (1) P --> R, ¬P, ¬R;  (2) ¬(P --> R), ¬R, P uncertain; (3)
¬(P --> R),  P,  ¬R  and it was observed that option (1) was chosen more
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frequently than (2) or (3).  Overall, it was also observed that giving up a
conditional premise was more frequent with Modus Ponens than with Modus
Tollens arguments.
The other issue is related to the principle of minimal change.  The problem
is to operationalise this concept.  From a syntactic view this refers to the change
computed as a function of the number of propositions added to, or subtracted
from, the initial set.  From a model-theoretic approach there are various
possibilities for computing the change.  The authors considered several of these
possibilities and tried to identify whether subjects complied with any one.  The
results of their final two experiments showed that no single algorithm could be
identified.  Rather, participants chose options that expressed uncertainty, or as
the authors put it, "... revisions that were not minimal with respect to what was
changed, but were instead minimal with respect to what they believed to hold
true without doubt..." (page 454).   To illustrate, given the initial set  P, Q, R, S  or
¬P, ¬Q, ¬R, ¬S   and the new information P, ¬R, ¬S   participants tended to opt
for the revision alternative  P, ¬R, ¬S, ?Q   (where ?Q means that Q is uncertain)
rather than for P, ¬Q, ¬R, ¬S.   Given that there was a strong tendency in the
third experiment towards the selection of a revision option that expressed
uncertainty (and no opposite trend in the first two experiments), what seems to
be the most remarkable feature in the data overall is that when offered this kind
of options to revise their set of beliefs, participants preferred to select them rather
than options that expressed certainty.  Now this tendency might be even more
clear-cut than appeared in the data because participants were not always offered
an uncertain option (as opposed to a certain option), especially in the first two
experiments where no option expressed doubt in the conditional premise alone.
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One reason to consider the importance of options that give participants an
opportunity to doubt propositions stems from the observation that an important
part of deductive reasoning occurs with uncertain premises.  On some occasions
they are treated as if they were certain (George, 1995), that is, people perform
sound arguments to conclude with certainty.  But on other occasions, such as
after the reception of a new piece of information or when the premise is doubtful
by itself, people attribute a degree of belief that is carried over to the conclusion.
This has been demonstrated in a growing number of experiments, the most
significant of which will be reviewed below.
In some studies, a piece of information was added to the premises of a
deductive argument in order to manipulate the degree of belief in one of the
premises.  
Politzer & George (1992) presented the argument form Modus Tollens: If
somebody touches an object on display then the camera starts up;  the camera
did not start up;  conclusion: nobody touched an object on display  to be
evaluated on a five-point  scale (certainly false; probably false; maybe true,
maybe false; probably true; certainly true).  One group of participants received
this standard argument while a second group received the two premises plus the
additional information the apparatus was correctly plugged in  (the moderate
reassuring condition) and a third group received the two premises plus the
information there was nothing faulty in the material or in the electrical supply  (the
strong reassuring condition).  While roughly the same proportion of participants
(80%) rated the conclusion as true (either probably true  or certainly true)  in the
three groups, the ratio of probably true  to certainly true  responses increased
from 1:1 for the standard group to 1:2 for the second group to 1:3 for the third
group, showing that the conclusion had a degree of belief that varied
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monotonically as a function of the strength of the major (defined by the strength
of the reassuring conditions).
These results were generalised by Chan & Chua (1994) who used various
non causal conditional rules, two different populations and both Modus Ponens
and Modus Tollens arguments.  For example, with a Modus Ponens whose major
was If Steven is invited then he will attend the party  three levels of necessary
conditions for the conclusion to hold (and therefore three degrees of belief in the
major) were defined and introduced by an additional premise (If Steven knows
the host well/knows at least some people well/completes the report to night, then
he will attend the party).  Essentially the same phenomenon was observed: the
rate of endorsement of the conclusion was a decreasing function of the degree of
necessity, whereas the rate of expression of doubt (maybe or maybe not) was an
increasing function of the degree of necessity.
Stevenson and Over (1995) manipulated the degree of belief in the major
premise by introducing various levels of frequency in the additional premise.  For
example, given the major premise If John goes fishing, he will have a fish supper,
there were five levels of frequency(John always/ almost always/ sometimes/
almost never/ never  catches a fish).  The likelihood of the  conclusion John will
have a fish supper  evaluated on a 10-point scale increased monotonically with
the degree of belief.
Some other experiments demonstrate even more directly the effect of belief
in the premises on belief in the conclusion.  No additional information was used
to manipulate belief in the premise but either the likelihood of the premise was
independently measured or the premise was formulated in probabilistic terms.
George (1995) asked participants to evaluate on a 7-point scale the truth status
they attributed to controversial cause-effect conditional statements (e. g. , if
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exports decrease, then unemployment will rise)  before using these statements in
Modus Ponens arguments with conclusions to evaluate on the same scale.
There was a high correlation between belief in the conditional and belief in the
conclusion, suggesting that the degree of belief in the conditional (the major of
the argument) was conveyed to the conclusion (unemployment will rise).
Cummins (1995; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, and Rist, 1991) demonstrated
that the acceptance rate of the conclusion of Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens
arguments with a causal conditional premise depended on the availability of
competing factors that could prevent the effect from occurring (which the author
called disabling conditions).  For example, of the following two arguments, If the
match was struck, then it lit;  the match was struck;  therefore it lit,  and  If Joe cut
his finger, then it bled;  Joe cut his finger;  therefore it bled,  people accept more
readily the conclusion of the first than that of the second. Thompson (1994)
obtained similar results with causal, obligation, permission and definition rules by
using conditionals with either low level of sufficiency (many necessary conditions
were missing) or high level of sufficiency (few necessary conditions missing).
Liu, Lo, and Wu (1996) defined three levels of "perceived sufficiency" for
conditional statements: high level (uncontroversial because definitionally true),
medium (expressing common regulations or habits) and low (expressing
obviously debatable stereotypes) so defining three levels of conditional
probability of the consequent given the antecedent.  They observed that the rate
of endorsement of the conclusion of the standard conditional arguments was an
increasing function of the level of perceived sufficiency.
In one of George's (1997) experiments, the degree of belief was
manipulated by formulating the premises themselves in probabilistic terms.  Two
kinds of conditional were contrasted and each of them used as the major premise
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in a Modus Ponens, e. g. : If Peter is in the kitchen, then it is very likely that Mary
is in the garden  (vs not very likely).  The conclusion was evaluated on a 9-point
scale.  The modal response was identical to the probability term used in the
conditional, suggesting inheritance of the degree of belief from premise to
conclusion.
In brief, there is extensive evidence that shows that belief in premises can
be operationalised and manipulated by various means.  In particular when the
premise is a conditional the manipulation always involves people's consideration
of tacit conditions that are necessary in order to render the antecedent of the
conditional actually sufficient.  When this is achieved, the truth status of the
conclusion is spontaneously treated by degree rather than in an all-or-nothing
manner and this degree is highly dependent on the degree of belief in the
premises.
   From this point of view, belief change looks like a reassignment of
strength of belief or weights to various propositions in the set (and giving up a
conclusion, the result of a weight that has become null).  In other words, belief
change could be cast within the more general problem of reasoning under
uncertainty.
The two experiments reported below were inspired by the foregoing
considerations.  They represent a short and preliminary step in the direction just
outlined, namely an attempt to test the hypothesis that belief change can be
measured by degrees, that is, in a qualitative rather than an all-or-nothing
manner and is affected by the degree of belief in the premises.
In the first experiment, participants received each revision option in two
versions, one certain and the other uncertain, so allowing a fair comparison of
their frequency of choice.  On the basis of research on uncertain reasoning and
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on some of Elio & Pelletier's data, it was hypothesised that choosing an uncertain
revision option is at least as natural a way to change belief in the premises as
choosing a certain option.
The question of the relative entrenchment of the two premises of the
Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens arguments was also addressed.  In Elio and
Pelletier's data with thematic content, the conditional premise was more
frequently abandoned.  We wanted to make sure that this result was not linked to
the pecularities of the sample of response options that were offered to the
participants.  Finally, another objective was to generalise the study of premise
entrenchment by introducing two other basic arguments which are similar to the
first two but contain no conditional premise.
Experiment 1
Method.
Materials.  Each participant received a booklet that contained a page of
instructions followed by four revision problems, one of each of the following four
kinds of deductive argument:
- Modus Ponendo Ponens (henceforth MPP, referred to above, following
the psychological tradition, as Modus Ponens): If P then Q;  P;  therefore Q.
- Modus Tollendo Tollens  (MTT, referred to above, following again the
psychological tradition, as Modus Tollens): If P then Q; not Q;  therefore not P.
- Modus Tollendo Ponens (MTP, also called disjunctive syllogism): P or Q;
not P;  therefore Q.
- Modus Ponendo Tollens (MPT): not both (P and Q);  P;  therefore not Q.
From an information point of view all four are equivalent in that they amount to
the detachment of the conclusion from the conjunction of the minor and the
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conclusion.  For example, Modus Ponendo Ponens amounts to the detachment
of Q from (P and Q), etc.
Each problem contained (i) two premises supposed to have been uttered
by two different persons (in order to allow independent questioning of the
premises); (ii) the statement of the conclusion (not to be evaluated) which
followed validly from the premises in accordance with one of the four arguments
above; (iii) a piece of factual information presented as indisputable that
contradicted the conclusion; (iv) five revision options presented in the same order
that constituted various ways to reconcile the data; (v) a request to justify the
choice of revision.
The first four revision options expressed:
- the negation of the minor premise
- a doubt on the minor premise
- the negation of the major premise
- a doubt on the major premise
Participants were instructed to choose either one and only one of these four
options or to write up (as a fifth open option) any other solution  (a combination
from the first four or a choice not offered).  This fifth option was proposed
because it was felt that the first four might be too restrictive and fail to capture the
whole range of revision choices that participants were likely to express.  A
sample problem is presented in the Appendix.
There was a common story (a space flight) covering all four problems.  In
order to limit belief bias, the premises were factual statements related to the
planet being explored.
 In order to avoid a confounding between argument form and content, each
argument form was framed in four different scenarios (four events in the
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exploration trip).  In order to keep some coherence in the story, the four events
appeared in the same order.  Participants were required not to go back to a
previous page.  Four orders of presentation of the arguments were chosen out of
the 24 theoretically possible.
Participants and procedure.  Eighty students of Commerce and Business
Administration at a higher learning institution in Paris, untutored in logic,
participated on a voluntary basis.  Questionnaires were administered in small
groups and completed in 10 to 15 minutes without time limit.
Design.  There were four argument types; subjects acted as their own
controls.
Results.
Two kinds of comparison are of interest.  The first one concerns the relative
frequency of uncertain responses.  It was predicted that these responses would
be preferred to categorical denials.  Table 1 indicates the frequency of choice
(certain vs uncertain) for each of the four arguments.
_________________
Insert Table 1 about here
_________________
Collapsing across arguments, participants opted for an uncertain choice 77.8 per
cent of the time and for a certain choice 16.6 per cent of the time.  The
differences across argument form are small and non significant (F(3, 228) ratios <
1).  The frequencies of certain and uncertain responses were submitted to a
bayesian analysis for each argument form separately.  The ratio f1/f2 = frequency
of uncertain responses /frequency of certain responses was chosen as the
relevant indicator.  The credibility intervals at p = .95 for these ratios were: [3.4;
13.2] for MPP;  [2.3;  7.4]  for MTT;  [3.3;  12.6] for MTP; and [2.4;  7.5] for MPT.
Medians of the associated distributions were equal to 6.37,  4.05,  6.12, and
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4.12, respectively (note 1).  In brief, considering all four argument forms, when
people were offered to revise a premise, they produced an uncertain response
four to six times more often than a categorical negative response.
These results are confirmed by individual results.  For each of the
participants (excluding five of them who produced more than one ambiguous
response) if we subtract the number of certain choices from the number of
uncertain choices (both varying from zero to 4), there were 63 positive values, 3
negative (and 9 ties), showing an overwhelming individual preference for
uncertain choices (z = 7,26;  p << 10-7, sign test).
The second comparison concerns the choice of the premise to revise.
Considering first the two conditional arguments, the prediction based on Elio &
Pelletier's results that the conditional premise would be more often revised than
the categorical one was confirmed:  as shown in Table 2, the major (conditional)
premise was selected about two to three times more often than the minor
(categorical) premise.
_________________
Insert Table 2 about here
_________________
The reliability of this result was again submitted to a bayesian analysis,
taking the ratio f1/f2 = frequency of revision of the major / frequency of revision of
the minor as the indicator of interest.  The 95% credibility intervals were [1.0;
3.1] for MPP and  [1.9;  6.1] for MTT with medians equal to 1.81 and 3.34,
respectively.  Again, this group analysis was confirmed by an individual analysis.
Sign tests calculated by using the four basic response categories of the
questionnaire indicated that the preference for the major (conditional) premise
over the minor (categorical) premise was reliable at the level of significance of
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.01 for MPP (frequency of conditional = 37, non conditional = 21, z = 1.97) and
for MTT (conditional = 48, non conditional = 15, z = 4.03).
Considering now the two arguments that have no conditional premise, table
2 indicates that there is again a clear difference in the frequency of revision
choices:  the major premise was selected about twice as often as the minor.  The
same type of bayesian analysis as above yielded the following results:  the 95%
credibility intervals were [0.9;  2.6]  for MTP and  [1.5;  4.5] for MPT, with
medians equal to 1.54 and 2.57, respectively.  The individual analysis using  sign
tests indicated a difference that fell short of significance at the .05 level for MTP
(frequency of major = 37, minor = 24) and a significant difference for MPT (major
= 46, minor = 18, z =3.37).   For the four arguments collapsed, the data indicated
a ratio of 3:1 in favour of the major (major = 39, minor = 13,  a highly reliable
result (z = 4.18).  Notice also that about one participant out of six spontaneously
decided to revise both the major and the minor.
Finally, an ANOVA performed on Table 2 failed to reveal an effect of logical
argument on the frequency of choice of the minor or of the major ( (F (1, 76)
ratios < 1).
Discussion.
In the present experiment, participants were offered the same opportunity
to select a revision option in terms of the negation of a premise (a certain option)
and in terms of the expression of a doubt in that premise (an uncertain option),
which was not always the case in Elio and Pelletier's experiments.  Whereas in
their data there was only a trend towards the choice of the uncertain option, in
the present experiment there is an overwhelming preference for the uncertain
option, confirming the hypothesis that the natural way to express revision of a set
of beliefs might be to doubt one premise (or more) rather than categorically
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denying it.  Of course, this claim is limited in scope to the specific kind of data
base that has been considered, namely factual knowledge in the frame of an
imaginary world.
Comparing the relative entrenchment of the premises of simple conditional
arguments, Elio and Pelletier's observation was confirmed:  the conditional
premise was more often questioned than the minor.  How to interpret this
phenomenon?  One might attribute it to some property of factual conditional
sentences.  Rather than looking for a post hoc  explanation, we prefer to interpret
it in the light of the data obtained on the other two arguments.  On both MPT and
MTP the major premise (which is non conditional) was also less entrenched than
the minor.  This suggests that it is not the conditional nature of the premise that is
important, but its status qua  major premise, that is, a compound proposition
obtained by the connection of two atomic propositions, one of which is affirmed
or negated as a minor.  From this point of view, questioning the major more than
the minor stems from the rather trivial fact that it is more complex in that it
contains a connection and has more chances to be the source of error.
Even if future research confirms the weaker entrenchment of major
premises, a formal property of the kind advocated by some AI approaches, the
role of premise content is in no way ruled out.  By using premises that had
arbitrary factual content, this factor was eliminated from the first experiment.
However, the observation that participants were essentially sensitive to the
uncertainty of the premises, together with the hypothesis that belief revision
consists of the reassignment of degrees of belief leads to the prediction that,
ceteris paribus,  the revision process will result in a premise being all the more
often questioned as people have a lower degree of belief in that premise.  This
hypothesis, which was tested in the second experiment, has already got some
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support from Elio's (1997, 1998) results.  She reports several studies with causal
conditionals in which the number of disabling conditions was manipulated, a
factor which, as noted above, seems to act as a mediator for the plausibility of
such conditionals.  Participants were more prone to retain the conditional
proposition than the categorical one when it had few disabling conditions, and the
reverse obtained when it had many.  However, in one study (indirectly reported in
Elio, 1997), the differences were small and in another study (1997, first
experiment) the results were not so clean-cut with one type of arguments (MTT)
as they were with the other (MPP).  This might be attributed to the rather crude
and indirect estimation of prior belief based on number of disabling conditions.
Although the author took the trouble to have the prior plausibility of the
conditionals estimated independently, she did not relate those estimates to the
posterior belief ratings.  But examination of the data suggests that higher prior
ratings of the conditionals were associated with greater entrenchment as
indicated by their higher posterior ratings and the lower ratings of the associated
categorical proposition.  Unluckily, this observation is post hoc  and limited to
causals.  In the next experiment, strong and weak prior degrees of belief were
defined and the effect of this factor on the entrenchment of the major premise
was studied with conditional propositions expressing various social rules (causal,
decision and means-end rules).
Experiment 2   
 Method.
Materials.    Each participant received a booklet that contained a page of
instructions followed by eight revision problems.  The structure of a problem was
nearly identical to that used in the first experiment, that is, two premises uttered
by two different people, a conclusion, the negation of the conclusion presented
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as an observed fact, then a request to choose a revision; the only difference is
that the choice was from four options (minor declared false, minor declared
uncertain, major declared false, major declared uncertain) instead of five.  Only
Modus Ponendo Ponens arguments were used.
On each booklet there were two blocks of four problems separated by two
filler items.  Problems were paired between the two blocks so that two members
of a pair differed by the plausibility (high or low) of the major (conditional)
premise while the thematic content was kept common to both problems.  This
was achieved by giving different antecedents but the same consequent to each
pair of conditional premises.  (These are given in the Appendix).  In brief, the two
blocks were made of four matched problems, with a high plausibility major in one
block and the paired low plausibility major in the other block.  Each block
contained two high and two low plausibility problems.  There were two kinds of
booklets that differed by the order of presentation of the problems, so that one
half of the participants received one order (randomly attributed), and the other
half received the reverse order.  The problems in the direct sequence were in the
following order: H1, L2, H3, L4, L1, H2, L3, H4 (where H stands for high
plausibility and L for low plausibility, and paired problems have the same
number).
The sentences were chosen as follows.  Ten pairs of conditional sentences
(presented in counterbalanced orders) were submitted to nineteen participants
who served as judges.  They were asked to estimate the plausibility of the
sentences on a five-point scale.  Four pairs turned out to be highly discriminant,
the mean difference in ratings between the two members of each pair being
nearly equal to, or slightly above, three points on the scale (whose range was
four).  These sentences were used to constitute the four paired problems.
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Participants and procedure.  Thirty-six psychology students at the
University of Paris VIII solved the problems before a lecture.  They answered in
10 to 20 minutes.  All of them were untutored in logic and belonged to the same
population as the judges.
Design.  All participants received two kinds of problems (high and low
plausibility) so that they acted as their own controls.  In addition, there were two
groups defined by the order of presentation of the problems.
Results.
No difference between the two orders of presentation was observed;
consequently the data were pooled across all participants whenever applicable.
It was predicted that premises with low plausibility would be more often
questioned than premises with high plausibility.  Overall, the low plausibility major
premise was revised 91% of the time and the high plausibility major premise only
43.7% of the time.  Considering the 36 (participants) x 4 (pairs of problems) =
144 paired observations, the number of times a low plausibility conditional was
revised while the paired plausible conditional was not revised was equal to 73,
whereas the reverse occurred only 4 times.
A within-subject comparison indicated that thirty-two participants out of
thirty-six questioned the low plausibility premise more often than the high
plausibility premise, whereas one participant questioned it less often (and there
were three ties); this result is very highly significant (z = 5.12  p < 2x10-7, sign
test).
A between- subject comparison was also conducted as follows.  The two
sub-groups defined by the two orders of presentation of the problems were
compared against each other.  Given that the direct sequence was D = {H1, L2,
H3, L4, L1, H2, L3, H4} and the reverse sequence R = {H4, L3, H2, L1, L4, H3,
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L2, H1}, performance on problems H1+H3 from D was compared with
performance on problems L1+L3 from R, and similarly performance on problems
H2+H4 from R was compared with performance on problems L2+L4 from D.  In
that way, performance was always based on problems borrowed from the first
block, that is, problems solved before their paired counterpart had been seen.
To analyse performance, the dependent variable that was chosen was the
number of participants who answered by revising the major premise of both
problems such as L1+L3, etc.  This choice allowed the use of chi-square
statistics in spite of the fact that measures were repeated across subjects.
Results are clear-cut as shown in Table 3.
_________________
Insert Table 3 about here
_________________
For problems 1 and 3 as well as for problems 2 and 4, most participants revised
both low plausibility major premises, whereas only a minority did so for high
plausibility major premises (χ 2 = 18.7, p < .001 and  χ 2 =  5.35, p < .05,
respectively).
There are two other questions of interest in relation to the first experiment.
One regards the choice of the premise to revise:  after pooling both levels of
plausibility, again a majority of choices (67,4%) concerned the major. Table 4
presents the distribution of the frequencies of revision (in percent) as a function
of the level of plausibility, of the type of premise revised (major or minor), and of
the response option (a doubt or a denial).
_________________
Insert Table 4 about here
__________________
  Comparing across levels of plausibility, for high plausibility problems there were
roughly equal percentages of revision of the major (43.8) and of the minor (56.2)
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but for low plausibility problems there was a sharp superiority in the percentage
of revision of the major (91 percent) over the minor (9 percent).
The other question regards the kind of revision expressed by participants
(uncertain or categorical).  Overall, there were roughly as many expressions of
doubt (51.7 percent) as of denial (48.3 percent).  This was the case for the high
plausibility problems as well as for the low plausibility problems separately.
However, this was not the case for the two kinds of premise separately, since the
major was significantly more often doubted than denied (Wilcoxon test applied
within subjects, z = 1.98, p < .05) while there was an opposite tendency (albeit
non significant) for the minor premise.
Discussion.
As expected, there was a sharp difference in the rate of revision of the
major premises as a function of their credibility.  They were more frequently
revised when they were less plausible.  Since in this experiment judgments of
plausibility crucially depended on world knowledge, and the logical form of the
premises as well as the form of the arguments were kept constant, the hyposis
that epistemic entrenchment is based solely on formal properties of the
propositions seems hard to maintain.
The problem of which premise people are more prone to revise, whether
the major or the minor, is highly dependent on the question of the major premise
credibility, since a variation in the rate of revision of the major automatically
implies a variation in the opposite direction in the rate of revision of the minor, by
complementarity.  This experiment shows that one cannot even discuss this
problem without taking into account the credibility of the major premise.  It sheds
some light on the question raised by the first experiment: the major was much
more often revised than the minor only when it had a low plausibility.  However,
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the fact that even with a high plausibility the major was revised over 40 percent of
the time attests to its frail entrenchment.
Finally, the question of the choice of the revision mode, by doubting the
premise or by categorically denying it is somehow clarified by the results.  The
major premise expressed a conditional relation referring to daily life.  Participants
doubted it more often than they denied it.  In contrast, this did not occur for the
minor premise, which expressed a fact.   So, more complex propositions that
convey relations rather than facts, that refer to a well-known domain and that are
plausible are more susceptible to being doubted than denied, a view that agrees
with Elio and Pelletier's.  But notice that the tendency to doubt rather than to
deny remains powerful since overall, roughly one half of all the responses in the
second experiment expressed uncertainty (while the denial-to-doubt ratio was
about one to five in the first experiment).
General discussion
Assuming that belief is a matter of degree, it is reasonable to hypothesise
that the aim of belief change is not necessarily to give up belief but more
comprehensively to alter the degree of belief.  If that is the case, all-or-nothing
formats of response  are too crude to evaluate belief change.  This is a
methodological point which should not be confused with the issue of the format of
representation  of belief strength, a theoretical problem.
Empirically, the first experiment addressed the question of how to better
capture people's expression of belief change.  It was inspired by the notion that
premises and conclusion of deductive reasoning often have degrees of belief that
people can express, and by the observation that participants of Elio and
Pelletier's (1997) studies showed a tendency to express degrees of disbelief
rather than sheer denials, even though they were not always given a fair chance
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to do so.  The main aim of the first experiment was to test the hypothesis that to
question the truth of a premise, qualifying it as doubtful is at least as natural a
way as qualifying it as false.  This turned out to be the case first with a set of
propositions containing arbitrary rules of categorisation in a fictitious
environment, for which over three quarters of the revisions were observed to be
uncertain.  This was confirmed in the second experiment where the environment
referred to everyday life and the propositions expressed conditions for a decision
to be made, for which there were about one half of uncertain revisions, which
suggests that the claim that is being made is susceptible to generalisation.
Theoretically, there are opposite views regarding the representation of
belief.  Harman (1986) endorses the notion that beliefs have degrees.  However,
he claims that degrees of belief are implicit (that is, obtainable by inference) and
have the status of an epiphenomenon resulting from the revision and the
reasoning processes which act on all-or-nothing representations.  This is not of
course the only possibility.  The other main hypothesis is that principles of
reasoning and revision act on degrees of belief directly.  Numeric formalisms
using probability are based on this view.
In the all-or-nothing case, inconsistency results from a clash between belief
in the new information and disbelief in the old one and coincides with
contradiction.  The degree-of-belief approach faces the problem of defining a
criterion of inconsistency for two different degrees of belief where at least one of
them is not full belief or full disbelief.  However, inconsistency could be a graded
concept too, that is, an increasing function of the difference in belief between old
and new information with a threshold value that triggers revision in the belief set.
The problem may also receive a solution if one adopts a connectionist approach
of the type investigated by Thagard (1989).  In that case, the degree of belief in a
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proposition could be represented by the level of excitation of a unit and a change
in the degree of belief would result in an adjustment of the level of excitation of
the other units.  This leads us to specify which propositions are assumed to be
affected.  In principle, all propositions in the set may incur a change in belief.
Although the first four options in the multiple choice of the first experiment
distinguished single premises, the fifth option offered an opportunity to express
wider changes; indeed, about 15 to 20 percent of the participants decided to alter
both premises; that only a minority did so seems to reflect the psychological
plausibility of the principle of minimal change.
The other main point addressed in this paper revolves around the notion of
epistemic entrenchment, the property of some premises to better resist
abandonment than others.  As recalled in the introduction, one approach
assumes that it depends on formal relations between propositions.  It is therefore
a reasonable investigation to compare the relative entrenchment of the major
conditional premise against the minor premise of elementary arguments.  Elio
and Pelletier found that the former were more readily abandoned than the latter.
This result was confirmed in both experiments, but it seems more economical at
this stage to link it to the syntactic characteristic of the major of the arguments
under consideration, namely the presence of a connective, rather than to a
specific feature of the conditional.  This conclusion stems from the result of the
first experiment in which arguments with a non conditional major premise led to
the same choices of premise to revise as arguments with a conditional major
premise and from that of the second experiment in which all arguments had
conditional premises as a major but led to different choices of premise to revise
as a function of the credibility of the major.
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However, even though it seems confirmed that some formal, possibly
syntactic, characteristics of propositions (such as connected propositions as
opposed to atomic ones) affect their entrenchment, the notion that belief has
varying degrees deeply alters the determination of the entrenchment of premises,
as well as the concept itself.  As shown in the second experiment, from the
moment there are premises which are more or less implausible, these premises
are more or less susceptible of being abandoned.  In brief, in addition to formal
factors, content factors affect people's change of belief.  Of course, not all AI
formalisms adopt an all-or-nothing representation of belief.  The psychological
literature reviewed above and the present results tend to suggest that there is
more psychological plausibility in the degree-of- belief approach.  Consequently,
entrenchment as defined solely by formal properties seems to have limited
psychological import.  On the other hand, viewed as people's unwillingness to
give up a premise for reasons linked with content, it is psychologically highly
relevant.
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Appendix
Experiment 1.  Example of a revision problem (case of a Modus Ponendo Tollens
argument).
You are going to the closest city.  On your way you meet a first informant who
tells you:
- The city is not inhabited both by Klingons and Bagors.
Soon after you meet a second informant who tells you:
- The city is inhabited by Klingons.
Of course, you conclude that the city is not inhabited by Bagors.
However, on arriving the next day you notice that the city is inhabited by Bagors.
How to reconcile all these data?  In your opinion:
1) It is false that the city is inhabited by Klingons.
2) It is not sure that the city is inhabited by Klingons.
3) It is false that the city is not inhabited both by Klingons and Bagors.
4) It is not sure the city is not inhabited both by Klingons and Bagors.
5) Other:
What are the reasons of your choice?
Experiment 2.  The four pairs of conditional sentences (translated from French) in
their high plausibility version (a) and low plausibility version (b).
1)  a.  If his car is beyond repair, Alex will change his car.
      b.  If his neighbour buys a new car, Bastien will change his car.
2)  a.  If the teacher is absent, the lecture will be canceled.
      b.  If a chair is lacking, the lecture will be canceled.
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3)   a.  If she is the first in her class, Aline will be admitted to the higher  form.
      b.  If she is polite with the teacher, Amélie will be admitted to the higher
form.
4)   a.  If Isabelle feels very sick, she will leave before the end of the show.
      b.  If Valérie has no more pop corn, she will leave before the end of the show.
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Footnotes
1. The computation is based on BAYCAT (Bernard, 1988).  Credibility intervals
are similar to confidence intervals.  The associated medians indicate that the
ratio f1/f2 has a probability of .50 to be inferior to the median and a probability
of .50 to be superior.
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Table 1.
Experiment 1.  Frequency distribution (in percent) of the revision choice type for
each of the four argument forms.  N = 80.
                                              revision  choice  type
__________________________
argument
form     certain   uncertain
unclas-
sified(*)      total
P --> Q;  P; /Q
     12.5      80.0      07.5      100
P --> Q;  ¬Q /
¬P      17.5      77.5      05      100
P or Q;  ¬P /Q
     15      76.2      08.7      100
not both P&Q;
P /¬Q      21.2      77.5      01.2      100
mean      16.6      77.8      05.6      100
* A few choices of option 5 did not allow classification as certain or uncertain
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Table 2.
Experiment 1.  Frequency distribution (in percent) of the revision choice for each




form   minor   major
minor  and
major   other (*)   total
P --> Q;  P;
/Q    27.5    46.2    18.7    07.5    100
P --> Q;
¬Q  / ¬P    20    61.2    16.2    02.5    100
P or Q;  ¬P
/Q    30    46.2    15    08.7    100
¬ (P&Q) ;
P/   ¬Q    21.2    58.7    18.7    01.2    100
  mean    24.7    53.1    17.2    05.0    100
* A few choices of option 5 did not allow classification
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Table 3.
Experiment 2.  Frequency of revision of the major premise as a function of the
plausibility of the premise.
problems 1 + 3
                                                    plausibility of major premise
number of problems
where major is revised
          High           Low
0 or 1               17               3
2                2              14
problems  2 + 4
                                                    plausibility of major premise
number of problems
where major is revised
          High           Low
0 or 1              10               4
2               7              15
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Table 4.
Experiment 2.  Frequency of revision (in percent) as a function of level of
plausibility, type of premise revised, and response option.                                                     
                                                       p r e m i s e   r e v i s e d
                                            m a j or                                  m i n o r
Plausibility
      response
   false
option
uncertain
      response
   false
option
uncertain
High       13.2       30.6       34.0       22.2 100
Low       43.1       47.9       06.3       02.7 100
